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19 APRIL 1972

Confidential



TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

STATSPEC

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19 APRIL 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 16)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 10-16 APRIL 1972

Moscow (3341 items)

Indochina	(11%)	13%
[Strikes on DRV & Escalation of War	(2%)	9%]
Podgornyy in Turkey	(--)	11%
Kosygin in Iraq	(4%)	5%
Soviet Cosmonaut Day	(--)	5%
Signing of BW Convention	(--)	4%
FRG Treaties With Poland & USSR	(1%)	3%
GDR Party Secretary Honecker in USSR	(1%)	3%
25th Anniversary of Soviet-Indian Diplomatic Relations	(--)	3%
CPSU 24th Congress Anniversary	(8%)	3%

Peking (1607 items)

Domestic Issues	(32%)	46%
Indochina	(28%)	25%
[Strikes on DRV	(4%)	17%]
[VWP 20th Plenum	(--)	2%]
[Communist Offensive in South Vietnam	(12%)	1%]
Palestinian People's Congress	(5%)	9%
Mauritanian Prime Minister in PRC	(--)	8%
UN Trade & Development Conference, Chile	(--)	4%
Assassination of Karume of Zanzibar	(--)	3%
PRC Leaders' Birthday	(--)	3%
Greetings to Kim Il-Song		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

The DRV media reacted to the massive U.S. strikes against Haiphong and Hanoi on 16 April by reaffirming that the Vietnamese cannot be intimidated by bombs and shells--an avowal also made in the 11 April DRV Government statement which had protested "continuous" attacks since 6 April. The seriousness with which Hanoi viewed the attacks, however, was indicated by the prompt issuance on the 16th of a joint DRV party-government appeal to "compatriots and combatants throughout the country"--only the second such appeal to be issued during the war. Where the DRV Government statement on the 11th had called on the "fraternal socialist" and other countries "to extend even stronger support and assistance" to the Vietnamese, the joint appeal seemed to seek a show of political solidarity from North Vietnam's communist allies. It expressed "firm belief" that "our brothers and friends will give us even more active support and will strongly condemn the dangerous schemes and acts of war of the U.S. imperialists in Vietnam." (A joint NFLSV Central Committee-PRG appeal, released on the 15th, had paralleled the DRV Government statement in calling for "increased support and assistance.")

Hanoi's plea for "more active support" to date has not prompted either Moscow or Peking to respond with an official statement, although both had done so following the 10 December 1970 DRV party-government appeal. Only North Korea and Mongolia have responded to the appeal officially, with a government statement and a foreign ministry statement, respectively. Some of the East European countries have issued government statements protesting the air strikes, but they do not mention the appeal.

Both Peking and Moscow have displayed concern to strike a careful balance between the demands of their allies and the broader considerations involving relations with the United States. Moscow did immediately, on the 16th, officially protest the strikes at Haiphong and Hanoi in a TASS statement--at a lower level than the nature of the attacks would seem to call for--which pledged continued "necessary aid." Peking has issued no official statement since the 10 April PRC Foreign Ministry statement supporting the DRV Foreign Ministry protest of the 6th against U.S. air strikes, though Chou En-lai on the 16th and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 18th reaffirmed Chinese support and took note of the strikes against Haiphong and Hanoi.

HAIPHONG, HANOI BOMBING PROMPTS DRV PARTY-GOVERNMENT APPEAL

The first monitored North Vietnamese reaction to the U.S. bombing of Haiphong was a brief Hanoi radio report broadcast at 0110 GMT on

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17 April--some six hours after the attack, which the radio said began at 0200 local time. It said that according to initial reports, three jets had been downed. This was amended 45 minutes later when the radio raised the figure to five planes, including one B-52. And the final claim was 10 planes, including one B-52, downed over Haiphong and five planes downed over Hanoi. The targets were described as "populated areas" including schools and residential quarters; some of the propaganda said that "hundreds" were killed or wounded.

A Hanoi radio commentary broadcast a half hour after the initial report of the Haiphong bombing labeled the action "a new and very savage crime and desperate act" by "the very obdurate and warlike Nixon clique which is sustaining ignominious defeats" in South Vietnam and throughout Indochina. Another radio commentary a few hours later labeled the President as "bloodthirsty" and said that the action against North Vietnam's two largest cities was an attempt to extricate the United States from failure by use of the "old air force trump card."

Hanoi media had first raised the specter of possible bombing of Haiphong in a 10 April domestic radio commentary which claimed that in addition to Secretary Laird's "threat" that air strikes would be continued, Presidential press secretary Ziegler had indicated that the bombings might be expanded to include Haiphong. That allegation was repeated in the DRV Government statement of 11 April, in a NHAN DAN editorial on the 12th, and in a commentary in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 13th.

The DRV indicated the seriousness with which it viewed the attacks when promptly on the 16th it issued a joint party-government appeal to "compatriots and combatants throughout the country." The only previous such joint appeal was the one of 10 December 1970 issued in the wake of the heavy November air strikes against the North and the abortive prisoner rescue attempt at Son Tay near Hanoi. The current appeal, like other propaganda, described the U.S. action as "a very grave escalation" undertaken in the hope of saving Vietnamization from total failure and compelling the Vietnamese to negotiate on U.S. terms.

It dramatized the contention that the Vietnamese cannot be deterred from their struggle when it recalled the "teaching" of Ho Chi Minh that "Hanoi, Haiphong, and other cities and enterprises may be destroyed but the Vietnamese people will not be intimidated." The appeal did not make it clear that the

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"teaching" in question was Ho's 17 July 1966 appeal for a united struggle for "total victory" in the North and the South--"against any odds and for however long" it might take. However, the VNA press review for 17 April said that along with the current party-government appeal, "all" of the papers, "to underline the nation's determination," reprinted in full President Ho's 17 July 1966 appeal "in which he expressed the Vietnamese people's iron-like will to struggle for independence and freedom." Ho's appeal was also broadcast repeatedly by Hanoi radio beginning on the 16th.

BACKGROUND: Ho's appeal--in which he had also affirmed determination to continue the struggle even if the United States expanded its forces in the South to a million or more men, used thousands of planes against the DRV, and the war lasted 20 years or longer--had been issued in the wake of stepped up U.S. attacks against the North, including strikes at Haiphong on 7 July. The pledge that the Vietnamese would persist in the struggle even if Hanoi and Haiphong were destroyed was repeated periodically through December 1967. The formulation was revived in a 10 June 1968 NHAN DAN Commentator article--at the time the issue of the North Vietnamese military presence in South Vietnam was being debated at the DRV-U.S. Paris talks. The only known recurrence of the formulation in Hanoi media between 1968 and the current revival was in a 31 May 1970 NHAN DAN article by Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap commemorating the 80th anniversary of Ho's birth. Giap quoted from the appeal in the course of documenting Ho's "genius" as a strategist. On 4 February 1970 Cairo media, but apparently not Hanoi, had carried an AL-AKHBAR interview in which Giap was quoted as saying: "The so-called might of the U.S. Air Force has been buried in the Vietnamese streets. The reason for that is, above all, that our people are not afraid of the U.S. aggressors and are determined to fight them. We intend to inflict defeat on the U.S. aggressors even if Hanoi, Haiphong, and other towns are destroyed."

NORTH-SOUTH SOLIDARITY,
SOCIALIST SUPPORT

A NHAN DAN editorial on the 17th echoed the appeal in reiterating that North and South Vietnam cannot be deterred from mutual support. The editorial was particularly abusive toward the President when it said that "Nixon has revealed his true identity; he is the greatest of war maniacs." Asking why the President had escalated the war and "committed very serious crimes that even Johnson dared not commit," the editorial said that the "very serious escalation" in attacking Haiphong

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"is an admission that the situation in South Vietnam is critical." The paper went on to say that "each time the Americans lay a hand on the North, the southern armed forces and people will punish them five or 10 times more heavily." Observing that the "historic NFLSV-PRG appeal"--issued on the 15th--had acclaimed the outstanding exploits of the armed forces and people in the North, the editorial concluded that the "hard blows by the Haiphong armed forces and people are the heartfelt answer from each of us to the blood-sealed South's appeal for combat coordination."

While the DRV Government statement of the 11th had reiterated that "U.S. bombs and shells have been unable and will never be able to subdue the heroic Vietnamese people," it had at the same time echoed earlier official statements in calling on the fraternal socialist and other countries "to extend even stronger support and assistance to the just patriotic fight of the Vietnamese, and of the Lao and Cambodian peoples as well, until total victory." The joint party-government appeal was notable for its reference to "support" rather than "assistance." After expressing thanks for support from fraternal socialist and other countries, it said: "In the face of the new situation, we firmly believe that our brothers and friends in the world will give us even more active support and will strongly condemn in time the dangerous schemes and acts of war of the U.S. imperialists in Vietnam." The statement thus seemed to seek a show of political solidarity from North Vietnam's allies at a time when U.S. officials, including President Nixon, have been implicitly criticizing the Soviet Union for its military aid to the DRV.

Hanoi has on occasion in the past expressed a "conviction" that further support will be forthcoming. The most recent official statement to use this formulation was a 19 January 1971 DRV Foreign Ministry statement which protested "massive" operations in Cambodia under "U.S. command" and other "intensification" of aggression throughout Indochina. But the context in that instance suggested military rather than political support. The statement said Hanoi was "convinced" that the fraternal socialist and other countries would "further step up their support for the Vietnamese people's resistance"

U.S. AIR STRIKES DRAW CONTINUED PROTESTS BY DRV SPOKESMAN

Since the 11 April DRV Government statement protesting U.S. air and naval actions against the North since the 6th, the DRV Foreign

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Ministry has issued three protests at the lower level of its spokesman--on the 13th, 15th, and 19th:

+ The spokesman's protest of the 13th charged that U.S. planes, including B-52's, "struck at a number of populated areas in Thanh Hoa Province" that day. It claimed that four planes, including a B-52, were downed.

+ The protest of the 15th charged that U.S. planes "repeatedly attacked populous areas" in Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh region on the 13th and 14th, while U.S. ships fired artillery off the coast of Vinh City (Nghe An Province) and Quang Binh Province. It claimed that six planes were downed and four ships set afire.

+ The protest of the 19th said that on 17 and 18 April U.S. planes and ships bombed and shelled "many populated areas" in the Vinh Linh special zone and in Ha Tinh, Nghe An, and Thanh Hoa provinces, "committing many new, savage crimes against the Vietnamese peoples." It said that the Thanh Hoa and Nghe An armed forces and people set fire to four U.S. ships.

The protest of the 13th used language out of keeping with the usual spokesman-level statement. It echoed the language of the 11 April DRV Government statement* when it called the raids "another new, extremely serious act of war escalation, an exceedingly barbarous crime of the Nixon Administration that most grossly encroaches on the DRV's sovereignty and security, tramples on all human morals and conscience, wrecks the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, and violates the U.S. pledge to cease its bombing of North Vietnam." It went on to charge that along with various actions in South Vietnam over the past three years, the Nixon Administration's use of planes, including B-52's, "to wantonly pour bombs and shells onto populated areas of the DRV has further laid bare its cruel nature and all the more proves that the U.S. aggressors are even more barbarous than the Hitlerite fascists" Like the government statement, it called on "governments and peoples of the fraternal socialist countries, the peace- and justice-loving countries, international organizations, and the U.S. and world people to act firmly and in good time to check the U.S. aggressors' bloody

* For a discussion of the 11 April DRV Government statement, see the 12 April TRENDS, pages 5-9.

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hands and to more powerfully increase their support and assistance." Only the higher-level foreign ministry statements of 29 December 1971 and 6 March had included such an appeal for increased aid.

The foreign ministry spokesman used more subdued language on the 15th, but his statement that day included some elements that were unusual for a spokesman-level protest. Thus he called the "new acts of war escalation" by the Administration "a crude encroachment" on the DRV's sovereignty and security, "a flouting" of the 1954 Geneva agreements, and "a cynical violation" of the U.S. commitment to end the bombing of the DRV. The spokesman's statement on the 19th, noting that the latest raids followed those in Haiphong and Hanoi, made similar charges and added that the strikes "constitute an insolent challenge to broad segments of public opinion in the world and United States," which is demanding an immediate end "to all acts of escalation of the war against the DRV."

AMERICAN LOSSES; In addition to the claims in the two state-
DRV CASUALTIES ments by the foreign ministry spokesman on
 the downing of 10 planes, a radio report on
the 15th said three more planes were downed that day--two in
Quang Binh and one in Vinh Linh--and that "a number of bandit
pilots were destroyed or captured."* On the 19th a radio report
claimed that U.S. planes had hit "a number of populated areas"
in Nghe An and Quang Binh provinces--an action not yet
officially protested--and that the people and armed forces downed
three U.S. planes, two in Nghe An and one in Quang Binh. This
brought Hanoi's total of downed planes to 3,499, including the
15 said to have been brought down over Hanoi and Haiphong on the
16th. (The U.S. Command said that an A-7 and F-105 were lost in

* A U.S. pilot identified as Albert Gale Despiegler, said to have been captured on 15 April in Quang Binh Province, was presented at a press conference held by Ngo Dien, chief of the Information and Press Department of the DRV Foreign Ministry, on the 17th. The press conference was reportedly convened to condemn the Administration's "extremely serious new war escalation of bombing and shelling" against the DRV, especially Hanoi and Haiphong. Captured American pilots were similarly presented at press conferences on 19 February of this year and on 20 and 30 December 1971.

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the strikes on the 16th. It also said three MIG 21's were downed.) Since 1 April, the DRV has claimed to have downed 53 planes, including five B-52's.

Hanoi has raised its total of U.S. ships "set ablaze" since 1 April to 22. In addition to the four ships mentioned in the 15 April foreign ministry spokesman's statement and the four mentioned in the 19 April statement, five others were said on the 18th to have been hit on 16 and 17 April. The 18 April radio report said that on the 16th the armed forces and people in Haiphong "hit and set ablaze" one ship, while on the 17th the armed forces and people in Thanh Hoa and Nghe An hit one and three, respectively. The VPA High Command on 16 April sent a message to the artillery forces in the Fourth Military Sector commending them "for their feat in setting U.S. warships ablaze 13 times in nine days ending 14 April." It called on the armed forces and people to "further heighten vigilance and stand ready to sink and set ablaze more U.S. warships so as to foil all the war schemes and acts of the U.S. aggressors."

There has been some Hanoi comment pegged to the action from 13 to 15 April, prior to the Hanoi-Haiphong raids. A Hanoi radio commentary on the 13th hailed the alleged downing of four planes over Thanh Hoa that day, while VNA on the 14th denounced strikes in which the United States "dropped hundreds of big-size demolition bombs on Xuan Giang and Xuan Hung villages in Tho Xuan district, killing or wounding many inhabitants, destroying many houses, and killing numerous draught animals." A VNA report on the 15th alleged that 130 civilians were killed or wounded as a result of U.S. bombings on Vinh City, the Nghe An capital, on 10, 12, 13, and 14 April. It claimed that the bombs hit a hospital area, "killing or wounding many civilians and patients there." On the 18th, a second VNA item on the raids on Vinh City said that U.S. strikes on 10, 13, and 14 April "killed or wounded many civilians, mostly women and children." Like the 15 April report, it claimed that a hospital was struck and added that a school and "many dwelling houses" were also hit, "killing or injuring many more persons, including patients and schoolchildren."

HANOI CALLS FOR VIGILANCE; NOTES CIVIL DEFENSE, COMBAT TASKS

The DRV joint party-government appeal urging "each citizen to be a staunch fighter" came in the wake of other recent official calls to the armed forces and people for combat-readiness and

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vigilance. On 6 April Hanoi had released a VPA High Command order to the armed forces on protecting the home front, and on the following day DRV media publicized a "recent" DRV Premier's Office directive on combat-readiness and air defense tasks.* Hanoi propaganda since the party-government appeal has discussed in unusual detail steps that must be taken to protect the nation and population in the face of continued air strikes. Hanoi radio on the 17th reported an "extraordinary" meeting held that day by the Hanoi committee of the Vietnam Fatherland Front as well as a meeting of representatives of military units defending the capital, at which participants voiced their determination to implement the appeal and to be combat-ready and vigilant.

An 18 April NHAN DAN editorial entitled "Every Citizen Is a Stalwart Anti-U.S. National Salvation Combatant" spelled out, in the most comprehensive manner, various important combat-readiness and civil defense tasks to be carried out. While the subjects of combat-readiness, vigilance, and civil defense have been staples of North Vietnamese propaganda, attention to them has increased since the November 1970 Son Tay raid.** There were indications in the propaganda following the Son Tay incident that Hanoi was displeased with the reaction to the raid and set out to tighten combat-preparedness and civil defense. Since then, propaganda attention to these subjects has been sustained, increasing after periods of stepped-up U.S. air strikes against the North.

The NHAN DAN editorial stressed that the evacuation of old people and children "from critical areas" must continue and asserted that areas and organs ordered to evacuate "must urgently fulfill this task." The organization of civil defense tasks, including evacuation, was also brought up in a NHAN DAN editorial on 7 April. Evacuation had been mentioned in some propaganda during 1971, but only in the context of calls for contingency plans that could be implemented promptly and effectively. Like the earlier directive from the Premier's Office, the editorial on the 18th noted a need for "reducing or postponing large meetings," as well as eliminating

* See the 12 April TRENDS, pages 11-12.

** See the TRENDS of 25 November 1970, pages 3-4, and 2 December 1970, pages 4-7.

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everything inconsistent with a militarized way of life.* (In addition to the directive from the Premier's Office, the editorial referred to one issued by the party Central Committee Secretariat, but no such secretariat directive is known to have been publicized.)

The editorial echoed earlier Hanoi comment on vigilance when it cited the need for more shelters and trenches and better air defense organization--such as alarm-sounding stations and first aid and fire-fighting units--which it said should be set up by the militia and self-defense forces. Following the November 1970 raids, Hanoi comment indicated that the population had been ignoring civil defense tasks when it called on the people to fix shelters that had fallen into disrepair.

The 18 April NHAN DAN editorial also reiterated recent calls for heightened combat-readiness and strength. It cited the party-government appeal's call for "every enterprise, work site, state farm, cooperative, organ, school, and street" to be "a trench ready to fight to shatter all military adventures"-- an injunction also contained in a November 1970 NHAN DAN editorial. And it urged local areas to draw experience from recent battles and reexamine their methods of organizing and setting up combat positions "to shoot down planes, to attack warships, and to counter commandos." The editorial's conclusion dramatically underlined the current concern for broad popular involvement in the war effort when it asserted that "every street corner, each street, and each village and hamlet is a fortress in the broad people's war." In the same vein, a 17 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial had said that the North "has steadily entered the war situation by adopting a mode of living similar to that of soldiers. Men are ready, and weapons are ready too."

* Information on the CPUSA delegation which is currently in Hanoi, carried in the Hanoi VNA English to Moscow service transmission on 18 April, noted that an address which delegation head Gus Hall had been scheduled to deliver "to the people of Hanoi" on the 17th was canceled because all public meetings had been postponed since the current escalation of bombing. It also said that most schoolchildren had been evacuated to the countryside. Hanoi media are not known to have carried this report.

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USSR OFFICIALLY PROTESTS U.S. BOMBING, DAMAGE TO SOVIET SHIPS

Moscow media reported the 16 April bombings of Haiphong and Hanoi some five hours after Hanoi's first report and tendered prompt official support in a TASS statement released later the same day. Moscow had failed to issue an official endorsement of the 11 April DRV Government statement or the 6 April DRV Foreign Ministry statement protesting earlier strikes, although the PRC supported the latter with a foreign ministry protest on the 10th. The five-day sustained U.S. strikes last December had prompted a USSR Government statement, and given the nature of the attacks on the 16th it would have seemed logical for Moscow to issue its protest at that level.* The use of the lower-level format of the authorized TASS statement seems a reflection of Moscow's concern to maintain a low profile in view of President Nixon's impending visit. The TASS statement was cast in relatively restrained language and did not explicitly mention the President or the Administration. On the 17th Moscow released the text of the Soviet Foreign Ministry note handed to Ambassador Beam protesting the damage to Soviet ships, but it has not to date reported the U.S. response.

Declaring that "Soviet leading circles are closely following" the situation and noting that the 16 April raids caused civilian casualties, the TASS statement asserted that "the Soviet people wrathfully condemn" the U.S. "acts of aggression." It mentioned no American leaders by name when it said that the U.S. air and naval buildup, the bombing raids, and Washington's decision to suspend the Paris talks contradict "official statements about the striving of the United States toward a peaceful settlement in that area." (An October 1971 TASS statement protesting strikes against the North had said those strikes were "personally approved" by the President.)

The statement included a routine affirmation that the USSR, conforming to the principles of "internationalist solidarity," will continue to give the Indochinese patriots "necessary aid and support." It concluded with a routine demand that the United States stop the bombings and other acts of war, and it added pointedly that "the path of negotiations without attempts at blackmail and diktat is the only way to resolve the problem of Indochina." No prior official Soviet statement on Vietnam has so directly endorsed the need for a negotiated settlement or so directly accused the United States of diktat in connection with negotiations; previous charges of diktat were raised in the context of decrying U.S. "aggression."

* Moscow does not use the vehicle of foreign ministry statements to protest actions in Indochina.

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The TASS statement's cryptic observation that expansion of "crimes" by "the American military" can lead to greater complication of the situation in Indochina and "of the international situation as a whole" has no precedent in Soviet official statements during the Nixon Administration, but it resembles allusions that appeared in some statements on the strikes during the Johnson Administration.* A Matveyev article in IZVESTIYA, summarized by TASS on the 17th, repeated the TASS statement's warning that the U.S. actions "cannot but adversely affect the international situation as a whole." It added that the Government of France is not the only one in the West to condemn U.S. actions, remarking cryptically that this is all the more true of "countries situated close to the focus of the American aggression in Indochina."

Moscow's cautious treatment of the Vietnam developments has been evident in followup comment, which has refrained from any mention of President Nixon. A 17 April PRAVDA article by the paper's senior commentator Yuriy Zhukov said that the "new Americanization" of the war by "Pentagon generals" will only bring greater cohesiveness and strength to the North Vietnamese people's struggle, "which relies on the mighty aid and firm support of the Soviet Union and all the socialist countries." Matveyev in IZVESTIYA scored "those in the United States" who refuse to give up their reliance on "gross force." (Atypically, the President was criticized by name in an 18 April commentary in English over Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress. The broadcast, pegged to the CPSU's May Day slogan calling on peoples of the world to demand an end to the bombing of the DRV, said "President Nixon has stated that the American bombers would continue to be used in Southeast Asia precisely as Washington sees fit.")

TASS' summaries of the PRG and DRV appeals of 15 and 16 April, like its accounts of the 6 April DRV Foreign Ministry statement and the DRV Government statement of the 11th, excised all references to President Nixon including mentions of "the Nixon

* An August 1967 TASS statement contained a similar assertion; and a December 1966 Soviet Government statement, decrying the authorization of U.S. forces to attack vessels off the coast of Vietnam, said that the action was conducive to "a further serious aggravation of the international situation." By contrast, the impact of U.S. bombings on an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations was broached directly in the February 1965 Soviet Government statement on the inception of the air strikes.

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clique." The Soviet news agency also left out each of the statement's calls on "brothers and friends in the world" to condemn U.S. escalation and acts of war and to increase their support.

Despite Moscow's general caution in alluding to the effect of the Vietnam developments on Soviet-U.S. relations, President Nixon's implied criticism of Soviet support for Hanoi in his 14 April speech to the Canadian Parliament was reported by TASS on the 15th and published in PRAVDA the next day. The President had made similar remarks at the 10 April Washington ceremony for signing the convention prohibiting bacteriological weapons, but Moscow had failed to acknowledge even that he spoke on that occasion. The Soviet report quoted him as saying in Canada that "the great powers must use their influence to halt aggression--not to encourage it." But Moscow went on to cite "political observers" as commenting that the President's words are "sharply at odds with the practical actions of the United States, particularly in Vietnam where steps are being made these days to widen American aggression against the Vietnamese people."

The only Soviet acknowledgment thus far of Secretary Laird's 18 April testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee appeared in a TASS commentary on the 19th, which took issue with Laird's objections to resuming the Paris talks and his warning that air strikes will be continued; but TASS did not mention his renewed denunciation of Soviet arms shipments to the DRV or his comment that the possibility of mining Haiphong has not been ruled out. Brief reports of Secretary Rogers' testimony on the 17th noted that he tried to "justify" the bombings by the need to protect American forces in South Vietnam, but ignored his comment that there was no evidence so far that the bombing had jeopardized the President's trip to the USSR or the strategic arms limitation talks. Soviet media had similarly ignored earlier statements by Secretary Laird and White House spokesmen condemning the Soviet role in Vietnam.

DAMAGE TO SOVIET SHIPS

The first report in Moscow media that Soviet ships had been damaged during the raid on Haiphong harbor came in a 17 April TASS report of combat operations in Vietnam which claimed that "vessels including Soviet ships" were damaged by "bomb fragments" and that there were "casualties among Vietnam dockers" who were unloading cargoes. This was followed by a TASS report of a GDR Council of

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Ministers denunciation of the U.S. air raids which claimed that an East German freighter was also damaged and that GDR citizens were injured. The Soviet Foreign Ministry protest note handed to Ambassador Beam on the 16th was carried by Moscow radio for foreign and domestic audiences later on the 17th. The note claimed that four Soviet ships were damaged and that "the lives and safety of Soviet sailors were endangered." It added that "there were killed and wounded among the port workers," but it did not--as Hanoi media had done--specifically claim that a Soviet ship's officer was injured.

The note called the "piratic actions" of the U.S. Air Force a "gross violation" of international law and freedom of shipping, in the vein of similar Soviet notes on past incidents. The protest also resembled past ones in asserting that the U.S. Government bears full responsibility for the actions and their "possible dangerous consequences" and in calling on the "American authorities" to take "strict measures to prevent such provocations." Some of the previous protests had included a demand for compensation and warned that measures might have to be taken in the future to protect Soviet merchantmen.

Moscow media have not so far acknowledged the U.S. reply, which warned that "countries which supply offensive equipment to the North Vietnamese and enable them to mount an invasion of South Vietnam share responsibility."

BACKGROUND: Moscow previously protested U.S. actions endangering Soviet ships in DRV waters in July and August 1966, in early June 1967 when a crewman was killed, in late June 1967, and in January 1968. Notes on the early-June 1967 incident and the January 1968 episode, in which no casualties were claimed, warned that "appropriate Soviet agencies will be compelled to take measures to insure the safety of Soviet vessels sailing for the DRV's ports." A Moscow radio commentary on the January 1968 incident included the unique warning that "those who infringe on the right of navigation must not forget that the USSR is in a position to inflict an equal reply on the aggressor."

Normally in the past Moscow has reported U.S. reply notes, picturing them as "admissions" that the incidents were caused by U.S. air action. In the case of the late-June 1967 incident, however, Moscow acknowledged U.S. statements in notes in July that the risk of damage to foreign ships in an "area of active military action" could not be eliminated, and also publicized its own reply rejecting U.S. attempts to "deny responsibility."

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Although Hanoi promptly reported that Soviet ships had been damaged, it has offered Moscow no official support to date. The previous episodes prompted statements from the DRV at the foreign ministry level and by the chamber of commerce.

SOVIET ASSISTANCE In addition to the TASS statement's stock, generalized promise of continued Soviet assistance and support, the Soviet leaders have been making similar statements in meetings with DRV diplomatic envoys. Although the timing suggests that these were meetings at which the DRV envoy presented the 11 April foreign ministry statement and the 16 April party-government appeal, neither Moscow's nor Hanoi's reports of the meetings mentioned that he did so. Nor are there any available reports that any Soviet leaders received a PRG envoy following the release of the 15 April NFLSV-PRG appeal. (Peking reported that Chou En-lai met the DRV and PRG envoys, respectively, on 12 and 16 April to receive official DRV and PRG statements, but there has been no report of any meeting at which the DRV's 16 April joint appeal might have been presented.)

Moscow media reported that Brezhnev, when he received the DRV ambassador on the 12th, promised continued "assistance and support." Briefer TASS reports of the ambassador's meetings with Kosygin and Grechko the following day did not attribute similar statements to those Soviet leaders, although VNA's accounts did so. TASS said the meeting with Grechko took place in an atmosphere of "friendship and unanimity," a description absent from its reports on the meetings with Brezhnev and Kosygin. VNA's reports did not characterize the atmosphere of the meetings. On the 17th TASS briefly reported that Katushev received the DRV charge d'affaires at the latter's request for a talk in an atmosphere of "cordiality, unity, and fraternal friendship" but did not indicate the subject of the talk. VNA's report, on the other hand, noted that Katushev promised continued support "on the military, political, and diplomatic fronts." VNA added that the charge d'affaires on the same day also saw Firyubin, who pledged Soviet support to the Vietnamese people "on all the three fronts of their struggle."

Following the reports that Brezhnev had promised continuing Soviet assistance when he received the DRV ambassador on 12 April, Moscow demonstrated support by publicizing the customary low-level protest meetings throughout the USSR and statements by Soviet public organizations. Such meetings and statements have been a

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standard ingredient of Soviet reaction to past U.S. bombings as well as to other major military developments in Indochina, including the Cambodian incursion in May 1970 and the Lam Son 719 operation in Laos in February 1971. Similar rallies and statements followed the Soviet Government statement condemning the series of bombings of the DRV last December. Reports of protest meetings have continued in the wake of the bombings of Haiphong and Hanoi.

Apart from the generalized statements on continued Soviet assistance in the official propaganda, there is relatively little publicity for specific Soviet aid. An 18 April RED STAR article, reported in Western media to have emphasized that the USSR would continue to supply necessary assistance and support "despite all U.S. warnings," is not available at this writing. The TASS press review of the 18th cited an article by Aleksey Leontyev in the army paper that day which promised the DRV "the necessary assistance and support in repelling the aggression," but did not refer to U.S. warnings.

A Mandarin-language commentary broadcast over Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress elaborated on types of Soviet military aid to the DRV and noted, atypically, that during the 16 April raids on Haiphong and Hanoi the Vietnamese forces downed 11 planes "with missiles and other antiaircraft weapons supplied by the Soviet Union." The commentary warned that the more stubborn the efforts of the "Pentagon chieftains" to achieve their military aim in Indochina, "the more effective the economic and military aid the Soviet Union and other socialist countries will give to the patriots."

Some low-level commentaries on the offensive in the South also contained atypical allusions to Soviet aid. An article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA by the paper's military commentator, summarized by TASS on the 16th, said the offensive demonstrates the increased might of the South Vietnamese PLA and observed that the current military operations were "carefully prepared and planned." They are, he said, "classic operations" and have the necessary support with "tanks, artillery, and rockets." A foreign-language Moscow radio commentary by Shakhov on the 14th denounced U.S. "slander" to the effect that there was an invasion from the North and that the military operations in the South are "not a guerrilla war but rather a regular war with the use of antiaircraft artillery, tanks, and self-propelled guns." Shakhov rejoined that the PLA in South Vietnam has "for a long time linked guerrilla

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tactics with classical warfare" and that it is no secret that the South Vietnamese patriots, "helped by their friends, are constantly renewing and perfecting their armament."

ATTACKS ON PEKING Moscow has taken the opportunity once again to contrast its support of the Vietnamese with Chinese "splittism" that encourages U.S. aggression. Commentaries broadcast by Moscow radio in Mandarin on 13 and 17 April, pegged respectively to Brezhnev's meeting with the DRV ambassador and the TASS statement, stressed that to assist the Indochinese patriots is the USSR's "consistent and principled policy." They claimed that Washington always takes Peking's attitude into consideration when contemplating further escalation of the war, referring in this context to President Nixon's visit to China and Peking's willingness to "collude" with the United States for closer relations. The commentary on the 13th elaborated on Soviet aid to Vietnam, noting that the USSR fulfills its "internationalist obligations" by shipping "modern war equipment to the DRV, such as rockets, antiaircraft guns, and supersonic aircraft," as well as economic aid.

On 11 April, however, TASS did briefly acknowledge the PRC Foreign Ministry statement issued the day before in support of the 6 April DRV Foreign Ministry statement. The TASS report was published in PRAVDA on the 12th. TASS had ignored the 29 December PRC Foreign Ministry statement on U.S. bombings, although some Moscow radio commentaries in Mandarin mentioned it. The 13 December 1970 PRC party-government statement supporting the DRV appeal was not reported in Soviet media until the 17th--after the release on the 16th of a belated Soviet Government statement supporting Hanoi's appeal.

Moscow ridiculed the 10 April PRC statement on the 15th over Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin, saying that while Peking "superficially" joined in the protests against the U.S. bombings, the PRC statement failed to make "an appropriate and principled appraisal" of the U.S. "crime." The Soviet commentary also noted sarcastically that the statement neglected to mention what "concrete measures" Peking was prepared to adopt to support the Vietnamese.

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EAST EUROPEANS REGISTER CONCERN OVER EFFECTS OF ESCALATION

East European reactions to U.S. air strikes on Hanoi and Haiphong have been restrained, registering concern over possible adverse effects of any further escalation of the conflict. Only the GDR, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia have to date issued government statements condemning the U.S. actions and calling for an end to the bombing of the DRV. The protests were at a higher level than Moscow's, and the GDR and Hungarian statements, though carefully measured, were also sharper in tone. None of the statements made any reference to the communist offensive or promised any additional aid to the DRV.

The East German statement of the 17th, reported by ADN, charged that U.S. planes damaged one of the GDR's freighters in Haiphong harbor and that some of the crew members were injured. Calling this a violation of international law, the statement declared that the U.S. Government must bear full responsibility for the injuries caused and for material damage. It also called for an end to the "U.S. terror attacks" on the DRV as well as to U.S. "sabotage" of the Paris talks.

Where the TASS statement mentioned no U.S. leader by name, the Hungarian Government statement of the 17th said "the American military command does not deny that this unprecedented escalation in the air war took place at the personal instruction of President Nixon." The Hungarian statement also went beyond the TASS protest in saying that by its actions the United States "wants to give events a new course and is beginning again to play with extraordinarily dangerous fire." It added that "the present aggressive steps can have no other results than an increase in the suffering of the peaceful population, the senseless destruction of U.S. military personnel, and large-scale deterioration in international relations." It concluded that "for all this, responsibility rests on the U.S. Government alone."

The Romanian Government registered its "profound concern" and "condemnation of the new U.S. acts of war" against the DRV in a declaration carried by AGERPRES on the 19th. Charging that the bombing of Hanoi, Haiphong, and other areas complicates the search for a political settlement of the conflict and "gravely endangers world peace," the statement reaffirmed Romanian support for the DRV along standard lines and called for an end to the bombing and resumption of the Paris talks.

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The Yugoslav Government statement, issued on the 18th and publicized by TANJUG, similarly expressed Belgrade's "deep concern" over the escalation of the bombing and called for a return to the Paris talks. It described the U.S. action as "a step back" from earlier indications of progress toward a political settlement, and it routinely reaffirmed Yugoslav support for the DRV. Judging by the TANJUG account, the statement made no reference to the possible effects of Vietnam developments on the international situation or on Yugoslav-American relations. But both Romania's and Yugoslavia's expressions of concern over the Vietnam developments, in addition to providing verbal support for the DRV, seemed to reflect apprehensions that any deterioration in East-West relations could adversely affect those countries' own balancing acts between Moscow and Washington.

Available East European press comment has hewed to similar lines in seeking to build public pressure for an end to the bombing and a return to the Paris talks, but it has generally been harsher than the official statements in condemning the U.S. actions. There has been no monitored East European comment on the alleged damage to Soviet and East German ships during the Haiphong raids. On the 19th Radio Warsaw assured domestic listeners that no Polish ships were damaged during the air strikes.

In contrast to Moscow's cautious treatment of the President, an article in the Czechoslovak party daily RUDE PRAVO on the 18th took the President to task for following "a dangerous course" in Indochina. Noting that the raids on the DRV were made "on orders from President Nixon," the paper said that almost at the same time they were taking place he was "not ashamed to talk in Canada about the responsibility of the great powers for detente." The paper added: "Can there be a more convincing proof of the treacherousness and hypocrisy of U.S. policy?" Radio Prague reported on the 17th that Federal Assembly Chairman Indra had received the DRV and PRG charges d'affaires, who presented copies of their protests against the U.S. actions. The radio said Indra denounced the U.S. "aggression" and assured the Vietnamese of "comprehensive support."

The Polish Government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY commented on the 18th that recent U.S. actions attest to Washington's "belligerence and unrealistic attitude." On the 19th the Polish Catholic daily SLOWO POWSZECHNE expressed concern over "where the escalation will end." It added that developments in Vietnam will affect the future of the Paris talks, President Nixon's visit to Moscow, and the U.S. presidential elections, concluding that "a single decision can complicate all these questions."

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The East German BERLINGER ZEITUNG, also on the 19th, termed "the mad bombing" of the DRV a last-ditch effort to save Vietnamization, all other avenues having failed. The paper cautioned that "such a policy can only lead into a dead end and will not alter the fact that a solution can only be found at the negotiating table."

Tirana, playing its familiar theme of U.S.-Soviet collusion, charged in an article in the party daily ZERI I POPULLIT on the 19th that Moscow is giving "covert support" to U.S. escalation of the war. It added that "the Moscow revisionists are betraying the sovereign interests of the peoples" and that Washington is not concealing its "satisfaction" at this development. The Albanian news agency reported on the 18th that Foreign Affairs Minister Nase had received the DRV charge d'affaires and was informed of the DRV party-government appeal. Nase, according to the agency, assured the envoy of the Albanian people's "determined support" for the Vietnamese people's struggle.

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PEKING OFFERS MEASURED RESPONSE TO APPEALS OF ALLIES

The intensified U.S. actions and the accompanying Vietnamese communist avowals to pursue the struggle have drawn a measured, restrained response from Peking, which has been striking a careful balance between the demands of its allies and the broader considerations of Chinese foreign policy and Sino-U.S. relations. In Peking's only elite or official comment on current developments since the 10 April foreign ministry statement denouncing U.S. attacks on North Vietnam, Chou En-lai expressed low-key support for the Vietnamese communists when receiving the DRV and PRG envoys on 12 and 16 April respectively. Peking's strongest reaffirmation of support for its allies thus far came in an 18 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial responding to the party-government appeals issued by the PRG on the 15th and by the DRV on the 16th. Both Chou and the editorial assailed U.S. air and naval attacks, taking note of the raids on Hanoi and Haiphong, but they drew no implications for Chinese security interests or Sino-U.S. relations, notably refraining from any attack on the Nixon Administration by name.*

In its reaction thus far, Peking has been cautiously responsive to its allies' initiatives and has minimized its own commitment. NCNA's accounts indicated that Chou's meeting with the DRV and PRG representatives were occasioned by their respective presentations of the 11 April DRV Government statement and the 15 April PRG appeal.** (VNA's accounts, on the other hand,

* During this period Peking has publicized several developments in Sino-American relations. NCNA reported the arrival of Senators Mike Mansfield and Hugh Scott in Peking on the 18th and a banquet the next day attended by NPC Vice Chairman Kuo Mo-jo. On the 12th Peking reported the arrival of the pair of musk oxen sent--as NCNA duly noted--as a gift from President Nixon and the American people. NCNA's coverage of the Chinese table tennis team's U.S. tour has thus far included only its stay in Detroit. The report on the group's arrival quoted John Scali as welcoming it to the country in behalf of the President.

** There is no report of a delivery of the DRV appeal to the Chinese leadership. Formal presentations of Vietnamese statements have occurred only on occasion in the past, including the previous DRV party-government appeal of 10 December 1970. Chou had received both the DRV and PRG envoys on 2 February this year, the date of the PRG statement responding to the President's 25 January address on peace negotiations.

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failed to note that documents were delivered, thus avoiding giving the impression that the envoys were petitioners.) The Chinese leaders have otherwise been silent on the Vietnam situation. Chou did not take the opportunity of a speech at a 16 April banquet for a Peruvian delegation to refer to Vietnam; and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei's silence on this subject in his speech at a banquet on the 17th was made the more conspicuous by a reference to the "expanding" war in a speech on the same occasion by the visiting Afghan foreign minister. Chi also ignored Vietnam in his speech at a Sierra Leone embassy reception on the 19th.

If Peking is to follow the pattern of its response to the previous DRV party-government appeal, the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial should be followed by a PRC party-government statement. This would seem the more mandatory now in view of the more serious U.S. attacks and the existence of appeals by both the DRV and the PRG. In December 1970 Peking issued an editorial and a party-government statement three days after Hanoi's appeal.

Apart from Chou's comments to the envoys and the editorial on the 18th, Peking's coverage of Vietnamese developments has consisted mainly of replays of reports and comment from Vietnamese and other foreign sources, including the texts of all official DRV and PRG statements. Peking has continued to sanitize comment from Hanoi on less than the official level. Thus, NCNA's account of NHAN DAN's 18 April editorial on the DRV appeal omitted a passage assailing "the reactionary, warlike, extremist Nixon clique" for taking "the most serious adventurous steps" and committing "more extremely barbarous crimes."

Since an 11 April NCNA account of U.S. raids on the DRV, Peking's only independent reportage on the Vietnam situation has been two dispatches from Hanoi on 17 and 18 April. The first one described stimulation of production in the DRV inspired by "the recent brilliant victories" of the communist forces in the South. The dispatch took particular note of the feats of peasants in a region in "the direct rear of the front." The dispatch on the 18th, attributed to the NCNA correspondent, records his eyewitness report of conditions in Hanoi and Haiphong immediately after the U.S. raids. The correspondent quoted Ho's 17 July 1966 statement that Hanoi and Haiphong may be destroyed but the Vietnamese will not be intimidated, and the dispatch closed with a confident claim that military ventures by the United States can only reveal its weakness and invite greater failure.

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CHINESE SUPPORT In his remarks to the Vietnamese representatives, Chou offered reassurances of Chinese backing for the war effort that were conspicuously absent from the two foreign ministry statements that had been issued by Peking since the communist offensive began on 30 March. On the 12th Chou promised "all-out support and assistance" to the Vietnamese--long a routine formulation--and on the 16th he declared that the Chinese will continue to "support" the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia so long as the United States persists in its "aggression." The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 18th took another step by reviving a quotation from Mao pledging that the PRC provides "powerful backing" for the war effort and is a "reliable rear area." The editorial promised that the Chinese were "determined to support" the war with "all their efforts" until the end. As in Chou's remarks, the editorial indicated that the Vietnamese could cope with the situation on their own, observing that the present situation is "very favorable" to the communists.

The Chinese response may have fallen short of the expectations behind the calls for increased support and assistance contained in the DRV statement and the PRG appeal delivered to Chou. NCNA's accounts--like those of the Vietnamese communist reports--failed to characterize the atmosphere of Chou's meetings with the envoys. NCNA's reports of Chou's 11 December 1970 meeting with the DRV ambassador concerning Hanoi's party-government appeal at that time, and of the meeting with the DRV and PRG envoys on 2 February this year, said that there had been "a very cordial and friendly conversation"--Peking's standard formula for meetings with fraternal allies.

In a move that may be related to Chinese logistical support for the DRV, NCNA announced on the 17th that the PRC communications minister flew that day to the DRV for "a friendly visit" at the invitation of the DRV minister of communications and transport. On the same day NCNA reported that the North Vietnamese gave a dinner for the PRC delegation which was also attended by Chinese "engineering and technical personnel working in Vietnam" and took place in "a cordial and friendly atmosphere."

Peking has made no mention of the Soviet role or of Soviet comment in connection with Vietnamese developments. There have been no references in PRC media to the alleged shelling of Soviet and GDR ships in Haiphong.

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U.S. ROLE On the 12th, before the attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong, Chou called the earlier U.S. raids on the DRV "a serious incident of expanding the war" and said the Chinese "are closely following" the development of the situation, a warning that last appeared in the 29 December PRC Foreign Ministry statement seconding Hanoi's protest against U.S. attacks. But he did not repeat this warning on the 16th, when he noted that the United States had employed "an unprecedented amount" of air and naval forces in Vietnam and had attacked Hanoi and Haiphong that day. Chou complained that the United States "has embarked again on the old track of war escalation," but he avoided any criticism of the Nixon Administration by name. The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial used stronger language, asserting that the raids had revealed the "aggressive features" and the "peace camouflage" of the United States. Also avoiding any mention of the President by name, the editorial said the "U.S. Government is still vainly trying to seek a way out by war adventures." Chou had referred to the "U.S. Government" on the 16th when he urged it to stop escalating the war and pressing Vietnamization, resume the Paris talks, and "actively respond" to the PRG's seven-point plan if it "really wants" a Vietnam settlement.

For the first time this year, Peking began on the 13th to pick up reports of antiwar demonstrations in the United States, including one dispatch mentioning a demonstration outside a hotel where Vice President Agnew was speaking. However, Peking has failed to mention opposition to the Administration's policies by political leaders, and in fact NCNA on the 7th had cited three Democratic presidential candidates as well as Senator Goldwater for views favoring the use of U.S. air power. Peking has thus avoided giving an impression that there are major American leaders offering alternative policies and thus providing an alternative to dealing with the Nixon Administration.

OFFENSIVE IN Consistent with the reserve the Chinese have shown
SOUTH toward the communist offensive in South Vietnam,
 Chou made only a vague reference to the offensive
when receiving the PRG representative on the 16th. Chou was
quoted as having "warmly congratulated" the Vietnamese
communists on "the brilliant victories they have won on various
battlefields" in South Vietnam, but he did not refer explicitly
to the current offensive. Also in accord with Peking's approach
during this period, Chou cited from the PRG appeal only the
passage declaring that Vietnam is one country and the Vietnamese

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are one nation. The main thrust of the 10 April PRG Foreign Ministry statement had been directed at justifying the North Vietnamese role in the offensive and rebutting the U.S. argument that it represents an invasion of South Vietnam.

The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial was more forthcoming in assessing the offensive, "warmly" hailing "the recent brilliant victory" by the communists in South Vietnam in their "fierce offensives" since late March. The editorial claimed that the communists had occupied "many strategic points and military bases," wiped out large numbers of the enemy, and won "splendid victories," demonstrating their "growing fighting capacity" and "the further bankruptcy" of the Vietnamization program. While taking note of the "unprecedented" deployment of U.S. air and naval forces, including the raids on Hanoi and Haiphong, the editorial expressed confidence that U.S. military pressure "had ended in failure and will surely end in failure at the present time and in the future." But while characterizing the present situation in Vietnam as "very favorable," the editorial stopped well short of the claim made in the PRG appeal that the situation is "unprecedentedly favorable" and that the communist position is "a winning and uptrend one." Peking's more sober, long-term view of the situation seems reflected in Chou's assertion on the 12th that the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are "persisting in protracted resistance."

In further publicity for the PRG appeal, NCNA on the 17th reported that the PRG charge d'affaires held a press conference in Peking that day and distributed copies of the appeal to Chinese and foreign newsmen. According to NCNA, he gave an account of "the tremendous victories scored recently on various battlefields" in South Vietnam.

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NFLSV/PRG APPEAL LAUDS OFFENSIVE; MEDIA DISCUSS FIGHTING

A joint appeal from the NFLSV Central Committee and the PRG welcoming the "great victories" in the offensive in South Vietnam and expressing determination to continue to struggle was released by Front media on 15 April. While predictably ignoring the role of North Vietnamese troops in the offensive, the appeal followed Hanoi's lead in diminishing any barrier between the two countries. It did not use the language of the 11 April DRV Government statement which had contended that all Vietnamese have the right to fight anywhere in Vietnam. But it did score the United States for "deliberately partitioning our country" and asserted that "they cannot change this truth: Vietnam is one, the Vietnamese people are one." It added that "the people in the North and South, millions as one man, are determined to fight our common enemy." Going further toward acknowledging the DRV's role in the South, the 16 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the appeal went beyond Hanoi's usual promise to assist the "frontline" and directly pledged that the DRV army and people "will strive to provide, most adequately, manpower and material for the South"

A request in the NFLSV/PRG appeal for more assistance from the communist world parallels a similar plea in the DRV Government statement on the 11th. After expressing gratitude to the governments and peoples of socialist countries and others, the appeal called upon "these brothers and friends" to demand that the Nixon Administration halt Vietnamization and "acts of war escalation" against the North and to "increase support and assistance" to the Vietnamese.

While suggesting that the current offensive is a major turning point in the war, propaganda does not go on to portray it as the final battle. Thus, for example, the 16 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial maintained that the southern "offensive and uprising is moving into a new phase of development" but carefully described the communist forces in the South as "advancing toward" complete victory. Consistent with this appraisal of the fighting, propaganda does not call for "uprisings" in all areas; instead making a distinction between the southern countryside, where "uprisings" are encouraged, and the cities, where "political struggle" is said to be developing. An article by the military commentator Cuu Long, publicized last October by Hanoi and Front media, had reflected communist restraint regarding the role of urban areas in its broad discussion which argued for

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increased action by main-force units.* Cuu Long indicated that "under certain conditions" the "struggle movement of compatriots in southern cities may develop into a broad revolutionary movement which, in coordination with other attacks, will contribute to overthrowing" the Saigon government.

The communists' hope to undermine Saigon's position in rural areas was underlined in a 15 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, summarized by VNA and Hanoi's domestic service. The editorial held that the engagement of Saigon's main forces has left the rural areas "unguarded" and "weakened" and has created a "favorable opportunity" for communist regional forces to launch attacks and destroy the pacification program. The editorial stressed the importance of attacks on military subsectors and, according to the radio account, it maintained that "it is necessary that the local people's war keep pace with the development of the situation."

"LIBERATION"
OF AN LOC

Hanoi and Front media on 13 April reported the communist assault on An Loc, the provincial capital of Binh Long, and noted that reinforcements for the city had been ambushed as they attempted to advance up Highway 13. The battle reports on the 13th claimed that the communists had seized a portion of An Loc and were continuing their attacks on remaining ARVN positions. The capture of An Loc by communist forces was claimed in a Liberation Radio broadcast on 15 April which cited "a report just received" that the town had fallen a few hours earlier. The radio alleged that An Loc was "completely liberated" and that the PLAF was encircling Saigon forces at the district capital of Chon Thanh. The "important significance" of the alleged "liberation" of An Loc was stressed in Hanoi and Front radio commentaries on the 15th and editorials welcomed this "feat of arms" in Hanoi's papers on the 16th.

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the "victory" at An Loc derided allied claims that the communist offensives have been checked; but, like other comment, it did not respond to reports that the 15 April communist attack at An Loc was successfully repulsed. Hailing the engagement as "a big annihilating battle," it maintained that Saigon's troops are "obviously" being "overwhelmed by the liberation forces on

* The Cuu Long article, publicized on 17 and 18 October, is discussed in the 20 October TRENDS, pages 7-9.

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many battlefields." The editorial echoed earlier comment which had suggested that the communists hope to launch further offensives from territory captured in Binh Long. Then, it maintained that the "liberation forces destroyed the enemy defense line in this area and quickly developed an offensive staging area and offensive position for the revolutionary forces." Similarly, an 8 April editorial in the army paper had claimed that eastern Nam Bo, which includes Binh Long, is a position from which to "stage offensives that exert a strong effect on the southern cities and rural areas, from Saigon to the Mekong Delta."

DRV COMMENTATOR "CHIEN BINH" ANALYZES SOUTH VIETNAM OFFENSIVE

The communist offensive was authoritatively discussed in an article by the DRV military commentator "Chien Binh" (Combatant), published in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 9 April and broadcast in Hanoi's domestic service on the 13th. Chien Binh derided the U.S. Administration for misjudging the timing and nature of the communist offensive and maintained that U.S. underestimation of its opponent and overestimation of the ARVN, the "critical situation" of Vietnamization, and allied loss of initiative combined to insure that the allies would be caught off guard by the attacks. Sarcastically calling attention to alleged allied miscalculations, Chien Binh asserted that "Nixon thought that the most critical time" would be over at the close of the dry season, but the ARVN was hit "as the first rains fell." He added that "Nixon thought there was no reason for the adversary, who had always avoided strong points and attacked weak points, to 'knock his head against a defense work of strong military bases,'" yet the PLAF attacked such "'strong points' on the Tri-Thien battlefield."

Chien Binh held that the offensive was "an important test" of Vietnamization and contended that the surrender and retreat of ARVN forces demonstrated the weakness of Vietnamization, adding that the war has developed in such a way that "the question of success or failure of the 'Vietnamized' war has become so obvious that even those holding U.S. weapons on the other side of the frontline can realize it." Offering lessons which he said the President can draw from the battlefield developments, Chien Binh contended that ARVN weaknesses have been exposed at a time "when the 'Vietnamized' war was developed in the most perfect manner and in strict conformity with criteria," and he asserted: "The gradual decline and collapse of the Saigon puppet armed

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forces, including mobile main-force units and regional security forces, is definitely irreversible."

Chien Binh dismissed the massive use of U.S. airpower in North and South Vietnam as "frenzied U.S. wriggling" in the face of the declining military situation in the South, and he noted that the "Vietnamese people" had predicted such moves. He concluded with an expression of confidence that, in the face of the allies' efforts to save themselves, the "resistance will continue and will be decisive," adding that "our armed forces and people must overcome many more difficulties and crush many U.S. dark designs."

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MOSCOW ON PRESIDENT'S VISIT

LOW-LEVEL COMMENT CONTINUES TO STRESS DESIRABILITY OF SUMMIT

Continuing low-level Moscow comment on President Nixon's impending visit, keyed to Brezhnev's remarks in his 20 March speech at the Soviet trade union congress, has avoided bringing up the Indochina developments and in general stayed away from complicating issues. Radio commentaries on the subject for foreign or domestic audiences have been appearing at the rate of one every two or three days since Brezhnev's speech, although authoritative discussions in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA last fall--shortly after the agreement on the trip was announced--remain the only articles devoted to the subject in the central press.* The most recent radio commentary was broadcast to Romania on 17 April. Citing Brezhnev's speech, it stated that the USSR approaches the summit from "practical and realistic positions" and reaffirmed Moscow's pursuit of a policy combining a rebuff of "imperialist aggression" with "a constructive approach toward pressing international problems." The USSR, the commentary said, "is ready for the dialogue with the United States."

A commentary broadcast to the domestic audience on 10 April illustrated Moscow's effort to portray a propitious atmosphere for the summit. Observing that "our listeners are greatly interested" in the forthcoming visit, the commentary approvingly cited the President's February foreign policy report and added that the attitude shown by "the present Republican Administration" reflects a widely held view in the United States. A closing passage assured Moscow's allies--in the vein of Brezhnev's speech--that their interests would not be jeopardized, but the commentary made no specific mention of any area of international tension. A "Radio Mailbag" program in the domestic service on the 12th, pegged to a listener's letter, was in a similar vein.

The domestic broadcasts on the 10th and 12th both listed possible agenda topics, the first broadcast citing "a U.S. Government representative" and the second ascribing the same list to the President. The topics included agreement on limiting strategic nuclear arms, joint efforts in space exploration, measures to curb pollution of the environment, increases in trade, increases in cultural and scientific-technical exchanges,

* Articles in PRAVDA by Nekrasov on 15 October and in IZVESTIYA by Mikhaylov on the 16th are discussed in the TRENDS of 20 October 1971, pages 17-19.

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"and so on." None of Moscow's reports on Secretary of Agriculture Butz' USSR visit has suggested that it was preliminary to the President's.

While Moscow has not devoted a commentary to the President's USSR trip in the domestic service since the 12th, it has continued to treat the subject at some length in broadcasts to North American audiences. Brezhnev's 20 March remarks were focal points of an account broadcast twice to North American audiences on the 13th, rebroadcast on the 15th, of a meeting between "members of the Soviet public" and staff members of the U.S. Embassy to commemorate the 12 April anniversary of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's death. The occasion is not known to have been marked before in Soviet media, which normally observe only the anniversary of Roosevelt's birth. Soviet speakers at the meeting were quoted as lauding Roosevelt's "realism" and as underscoring the applicability of his approach today. G. A. Arbatov, director of the Institute for U.S. Studies and a prominent commentator on U.S.-Soviet relations, expressed hope that the President's visit would "lead to positive changes in Soviet-American relations." Arbatov reportedly mentioned the war in Vietnam--but not the recent developments--as one factor along with the Middle East situation and the arms race that made changes "in the world situation" imperative.

While sustaining its careful, restrained treatment of President Nixon personally, Moscow used the President's statements before the Canadian Parliament to juxtapose the subjects of U.S. behavior in Vietnam and the forthcoming Moscow visit. TASS on 15 April quoted "political observers" in Ottawa as commenting that "the U.S. President's words" about the big powers' responsibility to use their influence to halt aggression, not encourage it, "are sharply at odds with the practical actions of the United States, particularly in Vietnam" TASS then noted that the President spoke of his scheduled trip to Moscow and his visit to Peking, saying that he believed the United States would "continue to have profound philosophical and significant diplomatic differences" with both the USSR and the PRC but that he expressed hope for new lines of communication that would increase the chances of talking about differences rather than fighting about them. The TASS report appeared in PRAVDA on the 16th.

* See the Indochina section of this TRENDS for a discussion of Moscow's reaction to the Vietnam developments.

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GERMANY AND BERLIN

SUSLOV DISCUSSES "CONSEQUENCES" OF FRG REJECTION OF TREATY

Some of the consequences of FRG rejection of the Soviet-West German treaty were spelled out for the first time by a high-level Soviet spokesman at the second and concluding meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet foreign relations committees' joint session on 17 April. Speaking in his role as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Soviet Union, CPSU Politburo member Suslov went beyond the comments made by Brezhnev in his 20 March trade union speech and by Gromyko at the first joint meeting of the foreign relations committees on 12 April in outlining the "extremely negative consequences" that would flow from FRG failure to ratify the accord. Suslov declared that rejection 1) would "undermine confidence" in the FRG not only on the part of the USSR but also among other European countries; 2) would "endanger the entire process of development of Soviet-West German relations and do serious harm to the cause of detente in the European continent"; and 3) would result in the FRG's losing "the political confidence of others" and losing its "significance for the Soviet Union as a serious economic partner." However, in an expression of optimism immediately following this declaration, Suslov went on to say: "We are confident, however, that the realistic forces expressing the will of the peoples for peace, including such forces in the FRG, will have their decisive say."

On the 17th, the joint session concluded the discussion on the treaty and "unanimously" passed a resolution addressed to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium recommending ratification of the treaty. Moscow media have given unusual publicity to the deliberations of the Supreme Soviet, as a vehicle for placing Soviet views on record regarding the treaty and in the process lending support to the Brandt-Scheel coalition.

Where Gromyko on the 12th unequivocally raised the "reverse linkage" issue in stating that the Big Four accord on "West Berlin" would be implemented "only simultaneously" with the FRG ratification of the treaty, Suslov simply listed the Berlin agreement as one of the byproducts of the signing of the treaty. For the most part, however, Suslov's speech closely paralleled Gromyko's.

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GROMYKO ON "REVERSE
LINKAGE"

In the discussion of his report to the foreign relations committee, Gromyko further elaborated on the issue of "reverse linkage." * Responding to a question raised in the discussion, the Soviet Foreign Minister noted there was "no legal connection" between the Moscow treaty and the "West Berlin" agreement, but declared that the latter agreement "will be brought into force only simultaneously with ratification of the Moscow treaty." According to the TASS Russian account, Gromyko argued that the Berlin accord and its subsidiary settlements are directed at easing tension in central Europe and at normalizing relations between the FRG and the socialist countries, adding that without the treaties coming into force, "the process of making the atmosphere healthier in this region would be placed under a threat."

During the question-and-answer period Gromyko indirectly acknowledged the West German position that the Moscow treaty is not a surrogate for a final German peace treaty--a position taken by the Bonn opposition in its debate against the Brandt-Scheel coalition and a topic of the 10 April talks between Brandt emissary Kuehn and Brezhnev. Answering a question regarding quadripartite responsibility--the residual rights of the Big Four powers as victor-states over Germany in World War II--Gromyko stated tersely that "the question of the four powers' rights was not and, naturally, could not be a subject for talks with the FRG Government. The question of the four powers' rights," he added, "is not affected by the treaty between the USSR and the FRG."

The detailed TASS Russian account of the 12 April discussion was carried in full in the Moscow central press on the 13th and widely publicized by Moscow radio, although the TASS English service carried only a brief version. The TASS Russian account pointedly cited remarks by deputies which reiterated Brezhnev's 20 March observation that it was not a "simple matter" for the USSR to sign the treaty with the West Germans because of the sufferings and memories of World War II. One statement which the TASS Russian service chose to publicize, by a Belorussian deputy, ominously warned the CDU/CSU opposition leaders to ponder on which is better:

* For background on Gromyko's speech, see the TRENDS of 12 April, pages 41-44.

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To have in the person of the Soviet Union a state conducting a friendly policy toward the FRG, or a state which, in view of the position taken up by the FRG itself, found it necessary to regard it as a potential violator of peace in Europe with all the consequences proceeding from this.

It was left to Lithuanian CP First Secretary Snachkus to point out in the discussion that the USSR has not forgotten the GDR; he expressed "profound satisfaction" with the development of the "friendly, truly fraternal relations" between the Soviet Union and the GDR.

Soviet military support for the treaty was asserted by USSR Army General and Deputy Minister of Defense Pavlovskiy at the meeting on the 17th. According to the TASS Russian account of his remarks, Pavlovskiy said that the "Soviet armed forces ardently and unanimously approve the foreign policy course laid down by the 24th CPSU Congress," but his praise for the treaty itself--"an important step toward easing European and world tension"--was more reserved. Pointing out that the signing of the treaty was a result of the CPSU's "consistent political line," Pavlovskiy went on to recall the victories over the "hordes of German Fascist troops" and avowed that the European status quo was determined by World War II and that the Moscow treaty only reflects "the historical fait accompli."

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USSR - TURKEY

DECLARATION ON RELATIONS CAPS PODGORNYY VISIT TO TURKEY

A short, unsigned "Declaration on the Principles of Good-Nighborly Relations" as well as a joint communique marked the conclusion of Podgornyy's 11-17 April visit to Turkey, repaying Turkish President Sunay's November 1969 visit to the USSR.* The Turkish press reported in February that Moscow had proposed to Ankara the conclusion of a friendship and cooperation treaty to replace the 1921 friendship pact abrogated by Stalin in 1945, but the Turks apparently opted for a less formal document: A foreign ministry commentary broadcast by Ankara radio on 6 April set the stage for the declaration on relations in stating that the two countries were trying to develop good-neighborly relations based on principles of sovereignty, respect for territorial integrity, equality, and noninterference in internal affairs. These principles are endorsed in the eight-point declaration and cited in the communique on Podgornyy's visit, as in the one on Sunay's 1969 visit to Moscow. The only joint document comparable to the Soviet-Turkish declaration is the Soviet-French declaration on "Principles of Cooperation" concluded on 30 October 1971--a lengthier and far more elaborate document.

Podgornyy gave the declaration advance publicity in an Istanbul banquet speech on the 16th, calling it and the communique "important documents" reflecting the present state of Soviet-Turkish relations and delineating their prospects. Podgornyy's publicized remarks during the visit and accompanying Soviet propaganda underlined an improvement in relations in recent years characterized by the "good tradition of meetings and talks" at various levels and the "resumption" of broad economic cooperation.

In his Istanbul speech, Podgornyy blandly noted "favorably developing political relations" and "undoubted progress" in economic cooperation and trade. The slow pace of such progress is revealed in the communique, in which the two sides note "with satisfaction" the development of economic

* Sunay's visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 26 November 1969, pages 37-39.

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and trade relations and cite specific projects due for completion in 1972 and 1973 as "progress achieved" under a March 1967 agreement. The two sides also "consider it useful to search for various spheres in which it would be possible and desirable" to develop scientific and technical ties. Again expressing satisfaction with bilateral relations in other spheres, the communique mentions "work carried out" on redemarcation of the frontier and expresses a shared desire to complete the talks on signing a consular convention--one of the still outstanding issues that had been mentioned in the November 1969 communique. At the same time, the Turkish press has brought up irritants in Soviet-Turkish relations which Moscow media have predictably ignored. They include the long-standing issue of the clandestine "Our Radio" broadcasts in Turkish as well as concern over "communist propaganda" emanating from Soviet television stations in border areas.

DECLARATION ON RELATIONS While Moscow of course never publicly acknowledged any approaches to Ankara on a new treaty, Turkish-language broadcasts over Radio Moscow in February and March pointedly recalled the anniversaries of the opening and completion of talks on the old treaty in Moscow in 1921. Podgornyy recalled the conclusion of the 1921 treaty in his first banquet speech in Ankara on the 11th; and a PRAVDA article on the 12th, commenting that the Soviet leader's visit would mark a new stage in the "development of good-neighborliness," also recalled that "important document." In a speech during President Sunay's November 1969 visit to the USSR, Podgornyy had paid tribute to Lenin and Ataturk as the founders of the two nations' relations but made no mention of the 1921 treaty.

The preamble to the Soviet-Turkish declaration stipulates that the document does not affect commitments assumed earlier by either side with regard to third countries and international organizations and is not directed against any other state. Point 7 pledges respect for commitments stemming from treaties and other sources of international law, and the communique similarly "attaches significance" to the need to respect such commitments. Turkish media in the past have ascribed importance to this formulation as an affirmation of the validity of the Cyprus treaties of guarantee and alliance, under which Turkey could claim the right to intervene in the island. While this statement has been customary in joint Soviet-Turkish communiqués, it was absent from the one on Sunay's 1969 visit.

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The declaration of principles also calls for non-use of force or the threat of force and for the two countries to refuse "to give their territories for staging aggression and subversive actions against other states." An article in the Soviet journal INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS last April, commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Soviet treaties with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, observed that it was in Turkey's own interest "to see that Turkish territory is never used against her neighbors."

USSR OPPOSES ENOSIS BUT SUSTAINS FLEXIBLE STAND ON CYPRUS

Podgornyy made one concession to Turkey during his Ankara visit by formally declaring Soviet opposition to enosis--Cyprus' union with Greece--in his banquet speech on 11 April, and his statement is repeated in the joint communique on the visit. Moscow's aversion to this concept has long been made clear in routine propaganda, but it has not previously been stated at this authoritative level.

Otherwise, the Soviet leader displayed Moscow's usual elasticity on the Cyprus problem by selectively restating elements of the standard Soviet propaganda position. Thus he called for removal of foreign bases but did not mention withdrawal of "all foreign troops"; the joint communique on Cypriot President Makarios' visit to the USSR last June,* on the other hand, called for troop withdrawal but not for elimination of bases. Podgornyy also reiterated Soviet support for Cyprus' independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity but omitted unity, included in the Makarios communique. While calling routinely for a peaceful settlement with no outside interference, he refrained from rejecting the use of force or threat of force against Cyprus; a formulation on that point appeared in the USSR-Cyprus document, in which the Soviet side "firmly came out against" any intervention, interference, use of force, of threat of the use of force--an implicit reference to Turkish or what Moscow alleges to be "NATO" threats.

* See the TRENDS of 16 June 1971, pages 29-33, for a discussion of the Makarios visit.

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TASS' treatment of President Sunay's speech at the 11 April banquet illustrates Moscow's cautious effort to play both sides of the Cyprus dispute: After summarizing Sunay's other remarks, TASS merely noted that he "also dwelt on the Cyprus problem." According to Ankara radio, Sunay spelled out Turkey's ties to Cyprus and its desire that peace be established through an arrangement enabling "each of the two communities to conduct its own affairs," and he concluded: "We believe the Soviet Union is very well aware of these facts."

TASS did report that Prime Minister Erim,* hosting the final banquet in Istanbul on the 16th, said Turkey will continue observing all provisions of agreements which led to the formation of the Cyprus Republic and will continue to defend the island's independence. Erim also noted, according to TASS, that "the Soviet Union too displays the same interest with regard to maintenance of Cyprus' independence based on the rights of two communities that ensue from agreements." But TASS did not report Erim's statement, included in the Ankara radio version, charging the "Greek Cypriot administration" with having further exacerbated the situation by "secretly importing a substantial amount of arms and ammunition." Moscow on at least one occasion has acknowledged reports of Cyprus' import of Czechoslovak arms: A Chistyakov article in NEW TIMES No. 9 for 1972 referred to press rumors in Nicosia "that the Cyprus Government had allegedly received a large consignment of arms from Czechoslovakia and intended unleashing civil war."

A guarded reference to Cyprus developments appears in the communique on Podgornyy's visit, which notes that the two sides held a "detailed exchange of opinions" on the Cyprus question and that the Turks informed the Soviets in detail about "recent developments." (Similarly, the communique signed with Makarios last June said the Cypriot president informed the Soviets about the situation and about "government measures to settle internal political problems.") The Soviet-Turkish document adds that both sides "expressed concern" over these developments. It was clearly with the recent events in mind that Podgornyy, in his 11 April speech, deplored "attempts at gross interference" in Cyprus' internal affairs. His remark came against the background of continuing, low-volume Soviet propaganda charges of NATO plots against Cyprus and attacks on the Greek Government for its 11 February "ultimatum" to Makarios which dealt, among other things, with the arms issue.

* TASS on the 18th reported without elaboration President Sunay's acceptance--on 17 April, the day Podgornyy left Turkey--of Erim's 27 March letter of resignation and the appointment of National Defense Minister Melen as acting prime minister.

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As is customary in Soviet-Turkish communiques, the two sides "reaffirmed their positions" on the issue, again supporting a peaceful solution and calling for observance of the legitimate rights and interests of both communities, insuring "their peaceful life in an atmosphere of full security." The Soviet Union and Turkey also supported continuation of the intercommunal talks, this time adding that they should be "held on an equal footing" and expressing hope for a successful outcome.

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PRC - JAPAN

CHINESE-DSP COMMUNIQUE LISTS CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZATION

Peking has taken another step to enhance its political assets in Japan, indicating in the process that it may be taking a more flexible approach to Sino-Japanese relations as Prime Minister Sato's retirement looms ahead and the debate over Tokyo's China policy proceeds. In the latest visit of Japanese political leaders favorable to Peking, the first delegation of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) of Japan to visit the PRC arrived on 31 March at the invitation of the China-Japan Friendship Association. According to a joint communique issued on 13 April, the DSP delegation acceded to Peking's basic terms for normalizing relations as "the prerequisites to the restoration of diplomatic relations," but the communique leaves it open whether the key political issues dividing the two countries could be resolved in the course of the negotiations rather than requiring agreement as a precondition for talks. Last December's joint communique issued by the Memorandum Trade Office representatives of the two sides had taken a hard line by stipulating, for the first time, that these issues were by "no means questions to be settled by negotiations."

In softening its line on this point, Peking may be pursuing a more flexible approach in order to broaden its leverage in the Japanese political arena. The tough stipulation contained in the December communique had not been present in earlier joint communiques on visits of the pro-Peking Japanese Dietman's League delegation last October and of the Komeito party delegation last July. Peking may have felt constrained to take the harder line in December because of the semiofficial status of the Memorandum Trade Office. Now, with Sato's retirement near and with hopes of influencing the succession, Peking may wish to appear more accommodating to a wide range of the Japanese spectrum. The communique on the DSP visit is less offensive in its references to the Sato government than earlier joint communiques in the past year.

Aside from reverting to a more flexible line on Sino-Japanese negotiations, the current communique essentially repeats Peking's standard "principles" for normalizing relations with Japan. The Japanese side agreed that the PRC is "the sole legal government representing the Chinese people" and denounced variants of a two-China policy, affirmed that Taiwan

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is purely China's internal affair, and agreed that the "illegal and invalid" Japan-ROC treaty "must be abrogated." Both sides joined in a passage deploring the treaty as a reason why the state of war has not yet been ended. It is presumably because of the peace treaty question that Peking insists on abrogation of the Japan-ROC treaty, in contrast to its tendency to regard the U.S. defense treaty with the Chinese Nationalists simply as a dead letter.

During the DSP delegation's visit from 31 March to 15 April it met with Chou En-lai and Kuo Mo-jo for a "friendly conversation" and held talks with a delegation of the China-Japan Friendship Association headed by its vice president, Wang Kuo-chuan. As in earlier communiques with Japanese delegations, the current one indicates an effort to reach as broad an accommodation as possible while softpedaling divergences. According to the communique, the exchange of views was conducted "in the spirit of mutual respect, consultation on the basis of equality and seeking common ground while reserving differences."

The Chinese side asserted that "Japanese militarism has already been revived to a considerable grave extent" and that "the Japanese reactionaries are stepping up army expansion and again taking the road of expansion and aggression abroad." The Japanese side, however, acknowledged only that there is a "handful of militarist forces in Japan" seeking remilitarization and asserted confidently that the "Japanese people will not allow this scheme to succeed." Pledging to "mobilize public opinion" and struggle for the normalization of Japan-China relations, the DSP delegation specifically called upon the Japanese Government to "promptly accept the basic principles for the restoration of diplomatic relations between China and Japan and completely change its policy of hostility towards China."

U.S. ROLE Unlike the communique on the visits of the Dietman's League delegation last October and the Komeito delegation last July--both of which condemned the United States for its military presence in Taiwan and Indochina and for allegedly aiding the revival of "Japanese militarism"--the current communique contains only one specific reference to the United States. Implied anti-U.S. criticism is contained, however, in a passage attacking "superpowers" for practicing power politics and "contending for spheres of influence everywhere." There is also a general call for "all foreign troops" to be returned to their soil.

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In the sole explicit mention of the United States, the Japanese Government is condemned for "pursuing a policy of tailing after the U.S. and showing hostility to China." But it is in this passage that the communique points to the "so-called peace treaty with the Chiang Kai-shek clique" as the reason why "the state of war has not yet come to an end between China and Japan and diplomatic relations between the two countries remains unrestored." There is no mention of the Nixon Doctrine, which was criticized in last July's communique with the Komeito delegation.

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USSR - HUNGARY

HUNGARIANS DENOUNCE SPECULATION ON TENSIONS WITH MOSCOW

A heightening of long-simmering Moscow-Budapest tensions is pointed up by an editorial in the Budapest "political and social" weekly MAGYARORSZAG which insistently rebuts "enemy" conjectures about a worsening of relations between the two Warsaw Pact countries, in the process candidly acknowledging a number of the factors that have sparked those conjectures. The editorial is keyed to the late-March visit to Moscow by Premier Fock, who frankly admitted lack of agreement on his return to Budapest, and recalls Kadar's mid-February visit to the Soviet capital. Kadar's visit had been preceded by a 3 February PRAVDA article which pointedly noted the Hungarian party's rejection of "anti-Soviet and nationalist" views.

Entitled "Budapest-Moscow," the MAGYARORSZAG editorial was notably carried in full by the Hungarian news agency on the 14th, two days before its publication. Charging that "Hungarian-Soviet relations are permanent targets of attack by the class enemy" and that "imperialist propaganda is trying to falsify and blacken" the two countries' relations by means of "well-known methods of manipulation," the editorial declares defensively that "anyone can find out" the topics discussed by the two countries' leaders. But it goes on to point to the "mutually frank" exchange of information and "open, comradely exchange of ideas"--euphemisms for dissension--and candidly concedes that "the future" of Hungarian-Soviet economic relations "is a widely ramified topic." In a thinly veiled acknowledgment of discord over Hungary's unconcealed desire for broader economic cooperation and trade with the West, it insists that the Soviet Union with its large production capacity and import market will "continue to be Hungary's biggest economic partner, and an ideal one."

While Soviet media have to date ignored the MAGYARORSZAG editorial, Moscow's leading orthodox spokesman in East Europe, Prague, promptly publicized it on the 14th in a CTK report which highlighted its most polemical passages.

FOCK STATEMENT Premier Fock's remarks to correspondents at Budapest airport on his return from Moscow on 29 March had included a candid admission of his failure to obtain long-range commitments from Brezhnev and Kosygin on

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deliveries of Soviet raw materials to enable the Hungarians "to develop an industrial structure which is more suitable to our national economy." Hinting at the unsatisfactory state of relations with Moscow, Fock noted that "to tell the truth, I did not even count on a definite answer" on this matter. But he voiced gratitude that Kadar, through his earlier talks with Brezhnev, had "created an atmosphere which made my talks much easier than I had imagined they would be before my departure."

The version of Fock's remarks published in the party daily NEPSZABADSAG on the 30th omitted an obviously embarrassing passage, included in the Budapest domestic service version, which stated that "there are smaller and greater difficulties, but we shall be able to overcome these en route" and that "we Hungarians--the Soviet comrades said in a laudatory manner--are looking a bit further ahead in economic matters now than they are able to do in the Soviet Union." Fock observed that the Soviet leaders "remarked on this in a rather jocular manner." The party daily also omitted Fock's expressed hope that "the Soviet comrades will not be angry" if he revealed that "we agreed to meet" Kosygin again later this year. And it edited out Fock's remark, with respect to his two-hour talk with Brezhnev, that "Comrade Brezhnev did the talking, not I." Both versions reported Fock as noting that "here at home we have had to rack our brains" to evolve economic proposals both acceptable to the Soviets and "useful and necessary for Hungary."

Soviet media, which gave pro forma coverage to Fock's 27-29 March visit, ignored his Budapest airport statement entirely.

LIBERATION DAY MESSAGES The Soviet leaders' message to their Hungarian counterparts on Hungary's 27th liberation anniversary, 4 April, was about the same length as last year's message but contained overtones of the tensions in the two countries' relations. Where last year's telegram had routinely congratulated the Hungarians on their successes in socialist construction and welcomed their contribution to communist unity, this year's was more pointed: It "noted with deep satisfaction that Hungarian communists take a principled Marxist-Leninist stand on the most important question of our era--that of consolidating the unity and cohesion of the socialist community and the international communist movement." With the recent bilateral talks fresh in mind, it added that "the Soviet people greatly value the friendship" of the two peoples "based on a complete identity of views and the firm

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principles of socialist internationalism" and that "they will do everything in the future in the interests of further developing and perfecting our fraternal relations."

The Hungarian leaders' response--as reported by MTI, which carried both messages on the 3d--pointed to Hungary's long-standing commitment to proletarian internationalism. In terms similar to last year's response, it noted the "joint task" to strengthen the unity of the socialist countries and conveyed "veneration, sincere respect, and fraternal affection" to the Soviet people in carrying out the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress and in building communism.

BUDAPEST YOUTH Western reports of a youth demonstration in
DISTURBANCE Budapest on the 15 March anniversary of the
 1848 uprising were confirmed in a 16 April
NEPSZABADSAG article denouncing a dispatch on the incident
published in the New York TIMES on the 12th. While repudiating
as "absurd" the TIMES' report of "barricades in the streets
of Budapest," NEPSZABADSAG acknowledged that there had been
"puerile behavior" by "some young people who cannot correctly
orient themselves regarding matters at a given moment and
express their erroneous views publicly as well." It stressed
defensively that "the situation has been normal and stable
and has reflected the trust of the people for as long as one
and a half decades in Hungary." By attempting to discount the
importance of an incident having deeply nationalistic overtones,
the paper sought to reduce the embarrassment of the Kadar
regime in a period of strained relations with Moscow.

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SOVIET COSMONAUTICS DAY

MOSCOW BROACHES U.S.-SOVIET SPACE COOPERATION IN STOCK TERMS

A moderate volume of Soviet comment on Cosmonautics Day, 12 April, adhered closely to a familiar format and dealt in brief with the possibility of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space research. In his keynote speech on the occasion, Academy of Sciences President Keldysh recalled past U.S.-Soviet agreements on space cooperation which provide, among other things, for the development of compatible docking systems of spacecraft of the two nations. In the course of a 12 April IZVESTIYA article, Cosmonaut V. Shatalov did not specifically mention cooperation with the United States but seemed to allude to it when he observed that "it is quite possible that the personnel of lunar stations and the crews of Martian ships will be international." In remarks reported by the Czechoslovak news agency on the 11th, Shatalov spoke only of cooperation with the socialist countries: Noting the role of Czechoslovak scientists in the launching of Interkosmos satellites, he said "this cooperation can be extended in the future to piloted flights."

Low-volume, routine propaganda treating President Nixon's scheduled 22 May visit to the USSR has noted, without comment, that one possible agenda item in the summit-level talks may be "joint efforts in space exploration."

Monitored Soviet media have not publicized Academician Boris Petrov's interview, in the New York TIMES on 2 April, in which he expressed optimism about prospects for a joint space flight and suggested that a joint mission with astronauts of the United States and the USSR "could take place in the middle of the 1970's."

SPOKESMEN REITERATE PRIORITY FOR ORBITAL PILOTED STATIONS

Soviet science spokesmen used the occasion of Cosmonautics Day to discuss Soviet priorities for space research in the usual broad, generalized terms and to play the standard theme that space research is important to the development of the national economy. In the keynote speech, Academy of Sciences President Keldysh said that the application of space achievements "to the needs of the national economy is being extended," citing improvements in the systems of space radio and television communication and the perfection of meteorological techniques which aid in rational use of the natural environment.

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On the matter of priorities, cosmonaut V. Bykovskiy, in an interview with a TASS correspondent reported on 11 April, repeated the familiar line that the USSR's "main task" today is to test orbital piloted stations. Stressing the benefits of such stations to the national economy, he said they will be used in the future as launching bases for long interplanetary flights. He went on to note, however, that "this doesn't mean we are not at all interested in flights to the moon or, say, to Mars. We shall make flights to the moon and Mars and other planets but, as they say, all in due time."

Reflecting the ongoing muted debate in Soviet media over the relative priority of manned and unmanned craft, Bykovskiy observed that there will be "a division of functions" between the two, with the unmanned craft coping with tasks of exploring outer-space areas difficult of access. Soviet cosmonauts, he said, do not consider automatic craft as rivals, but rather as tools in the hands of man. But he appeared to come down on the side of manned flights when he concluded that "human participation . . . gives such an advantage as conscious choice of objects for research."*

Cosmonaut V. Shatalov also laid stress on the perfection of orbital stations as the main objective of Soviet cosmonautics. In his article in IZVESTIYA on the 12th, contrasting the U.S. and Soviet approaches to lunar research, he said the USSR has demonstrated that many tasks "can be resolved with the aid of more economical flights by automatic stations." Regarding possible manned Soviet flights in earth orbits in the future, the Czechoslovak news agency on the 11th quoted Shatalov as stating that the USSR is planning further flights, "probably this year." Disputing the idea that a precise date should be set, he observed that pressures to adhere to an announced timetable "in no way help create the atmosphere needed for responsible and careful preparations for every flight."

* Soviet media have so far carried brief, straightforward reports on the launching and progress of Apollo 16, in keeping with their usual treatment of major U.S. space ventures.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

UKRAINIAN FILM CHIEF FIRED FOR "IDEOLOGICALLY HARMFUL" FILM

Ukrainian Cinema Committee chairman S.P. Ivanov has been removed after being sharply criticized for allowing the production and distribution of an "ideologically harmful" film. Entitled "A Long Farewell," the film was condemned in a 1 February PRAVDA UKRAINY editorial, in a lengthy 19 February RADYANSKA UKRAINA article, and at a Kiev meeting of Moscow and Ukrainian cinema officials reported in SOVIET CULTURE on 2 March. Ivanov's transfer to "other work" was announced in the 9 April RADYANSKA UKRAINA; he is succeeded by V.G. Bolshak, who has been chief of the Ukrainian branch of the Novosti press agency since August 1970. Ivanov is a longtime associate of Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest, having served as editor of the Kiev paper VECHIRNIY KIIV in the late 1950's while Shelest was Kiev obkom first secretary and having been appointed head of the newly formed cinema committee shortly after Shelest became Ukrainian first secretary in mid-1963.

The film, depicting a family breakup and the failure of personal relationships, was assailed for presenting a negative image of Soviet society. According to the RADYANSKA UKRAINA article, the screenplay by N. Ryazantsev was accepted by the Odessa film studio despite its rejection by Moscow film studios. The republic cinema committee, after noting the script's "many mistakes" and initially objecting, eventually changed its mind and gave the script "its blessing." The finished film, directed by K. Muratova, was filled with "obvious" errors; but the studio, the cinema committee, and "its chairman S. Ivanov showed complete lack of principle, lack of ideological demandingness and disregard for high ideological-artistic principles" in accepting it. When released, the film provoked sharp criticism from viewers in Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, Riga and elsewhere and was removed from the screen. But despite the criticism, complained RADYANSKA UKRAINA, Muratova's friends--including the secretary of the Ukrainian cinema workers union--continued to praise the film.

The removal of Ivanov may have been prompted by intervention from Moscow. A 2 March SOVIET CULTURE article reports that after the 25 January publication of the CPSU Central Committee

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decree on literary criticism, the secretariat of the board of the USSR Cinema Workers Union met in Kiev with Kiev and Odessa film makers to discuss their work "in the spirit" of the decree and "from high positions of demandingness." At this session, attended by Ivanov and F.T. Yermash, the CPSU Central Committee culture section's deputy head in charge of the cinema, Muratova's film underwent "analysis" and Muratova made a speech conceding some of its shortcomings. She reportedly admitted that strict objectivity leads to "distortion of reality and to untruth" and that the film "in essence" was an "imitation" of real life.

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PEOPLE'S DAILY PRESSES AGRICULTURAL DIVERSIFICATION LINE

A 16 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial has given added impetus to Peking's year-long drive toward agricultural diversification, warning hesitant cadres that "it is impermissible to criticize as a capitalist tendency the diversified economy which is encouraged and permitted by the party's policies." The editorial goes beyond previous guidelines in discussing specific lines of action to assure that diversification takes place, most notably an offer of guarantees to areas concentrating on nongrain crops that they will receive as much food grain as their neighbors.

During the cultural revolution PRC media stressed grain almost to the exclusion of other crops, enjoining all agricultural areas to become self-sufficient in grain even if other crops suffered. In 1971, following a record grain crop in 1970 and also perhaps reflecting changes in the ideological character of the PRC leadership, the agricultural line underwent a definite shift in favor of a more balanced approach.

While the annual PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on spring farming, issued on 9 March, did not take up the issue of diversification, lower-level comment has indicated that a major problem facing the PRC leadership is cadre reluctance to adapt to the current relaxed policies on agriculture, including diversification. The 16 April editorial notes that "some comrades" view the moves as a "capitalist tendency," but probably the real reason for cadres' reluctance is an inhibiting memory of the attacks they suffered during the cultural revolution for "sabotaging" grain production. The fact that a second PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on spring farming was deemed necessary indicates that resistance to the current policies has assumed serious proportions.

Mao's slogan "take grain as the key link" is still presented as the basic line for agricultural planning, but the 16 April editorial qualifies the slogan by stating that it applies to the whole country "in general." The editorial departs from previous authoritative statements by making it clear that "areas chiefly engaged in growing industrial crops should continue to concentrate on such crops." While they should make efforts to grow some grain, they should focus on their "primary tasks."

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Three major reasons are presented to demonstrate the merits of diversification: auxiliary manpower and specialists will have work to do in all seasons, diversification helps accumulate funds faster for agricultural mechanization, and diversification allows fuller and more rational land utilization. Incentives offered the peasants to diversify include not only relaxed rules on sideline occupations, which can be a major source of peasant income, but also the assurance that areas engaged in commercial crop growing shall receive the same per capita grain allowance as those in "neighboring grain-producing areas."

The measures advocated by PEOPLE'S DAILY seem to reflect and confer the center's authority on policies previously publicized in provincial media. Thus, a Kiangsi provincial service broadcast on 28 March, reporting on the main cotton-producing counties of the province, noted that "in the past" most of the communes grew both grain and cotton, "neglecting the rational geographical distribution of grain and cotton areas." This resulted in problems with agricultural resource allocation in the communes, and "because of a tendency to stress grain at the expense of cotton" the peasants failed to raise the yield of either crop. Learning from a model brigade which had consolidated its cotton-growing area, the administrative region's party committee met in early January and by the first of March had reallocated assignments so that over 90 percent of the cotton-growing land was farmed by teams specifically assigned to concentrate on growing cotton. This is not only said to have resolved some of the resource allocation arguments but also to have allowed for concentrating experienced leadership and technical assistance where they were most needed.

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TOPIC IN BRIEF

THE CPSU'S MAY DAY SLOGANS

There are no surprises in this year's CPSU Central Committee slogans for May Day, released 15 April, and few changes from the list issued for the 1971 October Revolution Anniversary. In the pattern of recent years, the semiannual slogans reflect broad, established policy formulas, avoiding innovative elements and skirting contentious issues in international communist relations. There are no noteworthy changes in the domestic-affairs slogans, which include the usual seasonal calls in connection with agriculture. There are no new slogans on foreign affairs and only a few amendments of previous ones:

+ Slogan No. 51, calling on peoples of the world to demand an end to the Indochina war, now includes a topical call for "an immediate end to the aerial bombardments and shelling of DRV territory"--seconding Brezhnev's publicized remarks to the DRV ambassador three days earlier.

+ No. 54 on Europe is reworded slightly to underscore the goals of a European security conference and the movement in the direction of greater East-West economic contacts: Where the October version urged a more active struggle "for the establishment of lasting stable peace on the European continent and for peaceful cooperation and the peoples' security," this one defines the goal as transformation of the continent into "a region of stable peace, security, and fruitful cooperation" between "states."

+ No. 55, which in October demanded a ban on nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, drops BW in view of the 10 April signing of the convention banning the development, production, and stockpiling of those weapons.

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